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Routine

PRECEDENCE

Secret/Excl's

CLASSIFICATION

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FROM: The Situation Room
TO: Dave Gompert for
INFO: the Secretary

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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DIA, DOS, review
completed.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

INDO-CHINA TASK FORCE

Situation Report No. 9

Situation in Viet-Nam and Cambodia
as of 0600 Hours (EST), April 7, 1975

CAMBODIA

Political (SECRET/EXDIS)

Acting GKR President Saukham Khoy sent a message to President Ford saying that the GKR needed additional time to find a peaceful end to the conflict in Cambodia. He stated that if the American people deny the GKR additional assistance, the GKR will have to abandon its search for a solution which will give Cambodians some freedom of choice as to their future.

In an April 7 conversation with Ambassador Dean, Saukham Khoy said that the GKR would decide what to do upon the return of Prime Minister Long Boret that afternoon. He thought that within the next 24 hours the GKR would try to get a confidential message to the other side through U.S. channels or go public. He also asked the Ambassador about protection for his family and was assured that we would take care of as many key Khmer leaders as possible.

Orphans (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

We have informed Phnom Penh that about 221 American families are now prepared to accept Cambodian orphans. Our Mission in Phnom Penh indicates that about 20 orphans have been located so far and plans to ask authority to use humanitarian assistance funds for relief, including transportation of orphans and attendants to the U.S. It is expected that AID will agree to a request from our Embassy in Bangkok for \$100,000 for Cambodian relief in Thailand, including a reception center in Utapao.

Estimated Days of Supply (SECRET)

Ammunition	13.5
POL	12
Rice	10

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GDS

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Embassy Saigon estimates 173,719 potential evacuees including 5,022 American citizens, 14,000 local employees and 100,000 to 150,000 local employee dependents.

Liberation Radio on Thieu's April 4 Speech (UNCLASSIFIED)

Liberation Radio characterized Thieu's speech as a demonstration of weakness and said his future was "dark and gloomy". The commentary reiterates the previously heard line that an administration must be formed in Saigon "willing to implement the Paris Agreement" and states "if a stubborn fellow such as Thieu remains in power, no problem can be solved in South Vietnam."

Refugees (SECRET)

The situation on-board ships off Phu Quoc Island has improved. Food and medical supplies have been distributed and the evacuees are quiet.

Orphans (UNCLASSIFIED)

According to a UPI story a senior aide to Social Welfare Minister Don, told the Director of World Vision in Vietnam that once the exit visas for 1,400 orphans had been processed no additional visas will be issued. We have queried the Embassy.

According to a Reuter story from Canberra, the GOA cancelled a second orphan flight to Vietnam because of the reported decision to grant no more exit visas.

ICCS - Iranian Withdrawal (SECRET/EXDIS)

The GOI Foreign Ministry on April 6 told our DCM that the GOI wished to play a constructive role in Vietnam but that events had made that impossible. Accordingly, the Shah had ordered evacuation. He said that no decision had been made on a residual delegation. Our DCM estimated that about eight was the number in mind. The Foreign Ministry said that GOI sources indicated that Saigon would fall within two weeks and asked for

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any information which might lead to a different conclusion. We have provided additional information and have asked Saigon to provide guidance on inclusion of Iranians in E & E planning.

FPJMT Personnel Reduction (SECRET)

Embassy Saigon has approved the proposed reduction of U.S. delegation personnel stating that the FPJMT operation will not be degraded.

APPROVED BY: 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

INDO-CHINA TASK FORCE
Supplemental Situation Report No. 9

VIETNAM

Military activity continues at a relatively low level throughout MR-3 and MR-4, as communist forces consolidate their positions in the regions.

Early this morning, about 60 rounds of communist rocket and mortar fire struck South Vietnam's main oil depot at Nha Be, which is located seven miles southeast of Saigon. Little damage occurred. Elsewhere in MR-3, the communists threaten several key urban centers and the major highway linking the delta with Saigon, but no significant battles have developed.

In MR-4, DAO Saigon reports that the NVA 4th Division continues to pressure ARVN forces defending Can Tho City. However, major fighting has not yet occurred.

The Defense Intelligence Agency reports that communications intelligence continues to indicate that many elements of the NVA 1st Corps are moving into northern South Vietnam. If true, this would be a significant shift of forces, since other units would then be free to move farther south.

CAMBODIA

Communist pressure on the defense perimeter around Phnom Penh continues to increase. The northwest defense line remains the most sensitive, troublesome area. The western portion of the northern dike line has been pushed back and the most forward communist positions are now some three miles northwest of Pochentong airfield. Gaps and penetration points are reported elsewhere in the defense line.

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The situation has deteriorated further along the western defenses. A new defense line has been established near Ang Snoul on Route 4, less than six miles from FANK's main ammunition depot. An assistant US Army attache who has visited the area reports that government forces may be pushed back another two miles along Route 4, thereby substantially increasing the threat to the ammunition depot and the airfield.

North of Phnom Penh, FANK positions near Prek Phnom also remained subject to KC ground attacks with no further territorial loss. Positions along the east bank of the Tonle Sap, south of Prek Phnom, are receiving increased enemy pressure as the communists may attempt to cut Route 5 in order to isolate the POL facility.

Southeast of the capital there was little change in the level of combat activity, despite prodding by senior KC commanders to immediately deploy troops from the Neak Luong battlefield. Recently intercepted messages indicate that there may be some delay in the movement of these forces as KC commanders along the lower Mekong are apparently finalizing plans for future combat operations while using the time to rest and refit their forces.

DAO Phnom Penh reports that FANK morale continues to decline generally, and most units remain understrength and ill-prepared to repulse a major insurgent push anywhere around the capital's defense perimeter.

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